The Chrome Security Team prioritizes the security and privacy of Chrome’s users, and we are unwilling to compromise on these values.

The Chrome Root Program Policy states that CA certificates included in the Chrome Root Store must provide value to Chrome end users that exceeds the risk of their continued inclusion. It also describes many of the factors we consider significant when CA Owners disclose and respond to incidents. When things don’t go right, we expect CA Owners to commit to meaningful and demonstrable change resulting in evidenced continuous improvement.

Over the past several years, publicly disclosed incident reports highlighted a pattern of concerning behaviors by Entrust that fall short of the above expectations, and has eroded confidence in their competence, reliability, and integrity as a publicly-trusted CA Owner.

In response to the above concerns and to preserve the integrity of the Web PKI ecosystem, Chrome will take the following actions.

Upcoming change in Chrome 127 and higher:

• TLS server authentication certificates validating to the following Entrust roots whose earliest Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) is dated after October 31, 2024, will no longer be trusted by default.
  • CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1,OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms+OU=(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US
  • CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2,OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms+OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US
  • CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048),OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.)+OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited,O=Entrust.net
  • CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority,OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference+OU=(c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US
  • CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4,OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms+OU=(c) 2015 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US
  • CN=AffirmTrust Commercial,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
  • CN=AffirmTrust Networking,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
  • CN=AffirmTrust Premium,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
  • CN=AffirmTrust Premium ECC,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
• TLS server authentication certificates validating to the above set of roots whose earliest SCT is on or before October 31, 2024, will be unaffected by this change.

Additionally, should a Chrome user or enterprise explicitly trust any of the above certificates on a platform and version of Chrome relying on the Chrome Root Store (e.g., explicit trust is conveyed through a Group Policy Object on Windows), the SCT-based constraints described above will be overridden and certificates will function as they do today.

To further minimize risk of disruption, website operators are encouraged to review the “Frequently Asked Questions" listed below.

Why is Chrome taking action?

Certification Authorities (CAs) serve a privileged and trusted role on the Internet that underpin encrypted connections between browsers and websites. With this tremendous responsibility comes an expectation of adhering to reasonable and consensus-driven security and compliance expectations, including those defined by the CA/Browser TLS Baseline Requirements.

Over the past six years, we have observed a pattern of compliance failures, unmet improvement commitments, and the absence of tangible, measurable progress in response to publicly disclosed incident reports. When these factors are considered in aggregate and considered against the inherent risk each publicly-trusted CA poses to the Internet ecosystem, it is our opinion that Chrome’s continued trust in Entrust is no longer justified.

When will this action happen?

Blocking action will begin on approximately November 1, 2024, affecting certificates issued at that point or later.

Blocking action will occur in Versions of Chrome 127 and greater on Windows, macOS, ChromeOS, Android, and Linux. Apple policies prevent the Chrome Certificate Verifier and corresponding Chrome Root Store from being used on Chrome for iOS.

What is the user impact of this action?

By default, Chrome users in the above populations who navigate to a website serving a certificate issued by Entrust or AffirmTrust after October 31, 2024 will see a full page interstitial similar to this one.

Certificates issued by other CAs are not impacted by this action.

How can a website operator tell if their website is affected?

Website operators can determine if they are affected by this issue by using the Chrome Certificate Viewer.

Use the Chrome Certificate Viewer

• Navigate to a website (e.g., https://www.google.com)
• Click the “Tune" icon
• Click “Connection is Secure"
• Click “Certificate is Valid" (the Chrome Certificate Viewer will open)
  • Website owner action is not required, if the “Organization (O)” field listed beneath the “Issued By" heading does not contain “Entrust" or “AffirmTrust”.
  • Website owner action is required, if the “Organization (O)” field listed beneath the “Issued By" heading contains “Entrust" or “AffirmTrust”.

What does an affected website operator do?

We recommend that affected website operators transition to a new publicly-trusted CA Owner as soon as reasonably possible. To avoid adverse website user impact, action must be completed before the existing certificate(s) expire if expiry is planned to take place after October 31, 2024.

While website operators could delay the impact of blocking action by choosing to collect and install a new TLS certificate issued from Entrust before Chrome’s blocking action begins on November 1, 2024, website operators will inevitably need to collect and install a new TLS certificate from one of the many other CAs included in the Chrome Root Store.

Can I test these changes before they take effect?

Yes.

A command-line flag was added beginning in Chrome 128 (available in Canary/Dev at the time of this post’s publication) that allows administrators and power users to simulate the effect of an SCTNotAfter distrust constraint as described in this blog post FAQ.

How to: Simulate an SCTNotAfter distrust

1. Close all open versions of Chrome

2. Start Chrome using the following command-line flag, substituting variables described below with actual values

3. Evaluate the effects of the flag with test websites 

Example: The following command will simulate an SCTNotAfter distrust with an effective date of April 30, 2024 11:59:59 PM GMT for all of the Entrust trust anchors included in the Chrome Root Store. The expected behavior is that any website whose certificate is issued before the enforcement date/timestamp will function in Chrome, and all issued after will display an interstitial.

Illustrative Command (on Windows):

Illustrative Command (on macOS):

Note: If copy and pasting the above commands, ensure no line-breaks are introduced.

Learn more about command-line flags here.

I use Entrust certificates for my internal enterprise network, do I need to do anything?

Beginning in Chrome 127, enterprises can override Chrome Root Store constraints like those described for Entrust in this blog post by installing the corresponding root CA certificate as a locally-trusted root on the platform Chrome is running (e.g., installed in the Microsoft Certificate Store as a Trusted Root CA).

How do enterprises add a CA as locally-trusted?

Customer organizations should defer to platform provider guidance.

What about other Google products?

Other Google product team updates may be made available in the future.

Supply chain security is at the fore of the industry’s collective consciousness. We’ve recently seen a significant rise in software supply chain attacks, a Log4j vulnerability of catastrophic severity and breadth, and even an Executive Order on Cybersecurity.

It is against this background that Google is seeking contributors to a new open source project called GUAC (pronounced like the dip). GUAC, or Graph for Understanding Artifact Composition, is in the early stages yet is poised to change how the industry understands software supply chains. GUAC addresses a need created by the burgeoning efforts across the ecosystem to generate software build, security, and dependency metadata. True to Google’s mission to organize and make the world’s information universally accessible and useful, GUAC is meant to democratize the availability of this security information by making it freely accessible and useful for every organization, not just those with enterprise-scale security and IT funding.

Thanks to community collaboration in groups such as OpenSSF, SLSA, SPDX, CycloneDX, and others, organizations increasingly have ready access to:

• Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) (with SPDX-SBOM-Generator, Syft, kubernetes bom tool)
• signed attestations about how software was built (e.g. SLSA with SLSA3 Github Actions Builder, Google Cloud Build)
• vulnerability databases that aggregate information across ecosystems and make vulnerabilities more discoverable and actionable (e.g. OSV.dev, Global Security Database (GSD)).

These data are useful on their own, but it’s difficult to combine and synthesize the information for a more comprehensive view. The documents are scattered across different databases and producers, are attached to different ecosystem entities, and cannot be easily aggregated to answer higher-level questions about an organization’s software assets.

To help address this issue we’ve teamed up with Kusari, Purdue University, and Citi to create GUAC, a free tool to bring together many different sources of software security metadata. We’re excited to share the project’s proof of concept, which lets you query a small dataset of software metadata including SLSA provenance, SBOMs, and OpenSSF Scorecards.

What is GUAC

Graph for Understanding Artifact Composition (GUAC) aggregates software security metadata into a high fidelity graph database—normalizing entity identities and mapping standard relationships between them. Querying this graph can drive higher-level organizational outcomes such as audit, policy, risk management, and even developer assistance.

Conceptually, GUAC occupies the “aggregation and synthesis” layer of the software supply chain transparency logical model:

GUAC has four major areas of functionality:

1. Collection
   GUAC can be configured to connect to a variety of sources of software security metadata. Some sources may be open and public (e.g., OSV); some may be first-party (e.g., an organization’s internal repositories); some may be proprietary third-party (e.g., from data vendors).
   
2. Ingestion
   From its upstream data sources GUAC imports data on artifacts, projects, resources, vulnerabilities, repositories, and even developers.
   
3. Collation
   Having ingested raw metadata from disparate upstream sources, GUAC assembles it into a coherent graph by normalizing entity identifiers, traversing the dependency tree, and reifying implicit entity relationships, e.g., project → developer; vulnerability → software version; artifact → source repo, and so on.
   
4. Query
   Against an assembled graph one may query for metadata attached to, or related to, entities within the graph. Querying for a given artifact may return its SBOM, provenance, build chain, project scorecard, vulnerabilities, and recent lifecycle events — and those for its transitive dependencies.

   A CISO or compliance officer in an organization wants to be able to reason about the risk of their organization. An open source organization like the Open Source Security Foundation wants to identify critical libraries to maintain and secure. Developers need richer and more trustworthy intelligence about the dependencies in their projects.

   The good news is, increasingly one finds the upstream supply chain already enriched with attestations and metadata to power higher-level reasoning and insights. The bad news is that it is difficult or impossible today for software consumers, operators, and administrators to gather this data into a unified view across their software assets.

   To understand something complex like the blast radius of a vulnerability, one needs to trace the relationship between a component and everything else in the portfolio—a task that could span thousands of metadata documents across hundreds of sources. In the open source ecosystem, the number of documents could reach into the millions.

   GUAC aggregates and synthesizes software security metadata at scale and makes it meaningful and actionable. With GUAC in hand, we will be able to answer questions at three important stages of software supply chain security:

   • Proactive, e.g.,
     • What are the most used critical components in my software supply chain ecosystem?
     • Where are the weak points in my overall security posture?
     • How do I prevent supply chain compromises before they happen?
     • Where am I exposed to risky dependencies?
   • Operational, e.g.,
     • Is there evidence that the application I’m about to deploy meets organization policy?
     • Do all binaries in production trace back to a securely managed repository?
   • Reactive, e.g.,
     • Which parts of my organization’s inventory is affected by new vulnerability X?
     • A suspicious project lifecycle event has occurred. Where is risk introduced to my organization?
     • An open source project is being deprecated. How am I affected?

Get Involved

GUAC is an Open Source project on Github, and we are excited to get more folks involved and contributing (read the contributor guide to get started)! The project is still in its early stages, with a proof of concept that can ingest SLSA, SBOM, and Scorecard documents and support simple queries and exploration of software metadata. The next efforts will focus on scaling the current capabilities and adding new document types for ingestion. We welcome help and contributions of code or documentation.

Since the project will be consuming documents from many different sources and formats, we have put together a group of “Technical Advisory Members'' to help advise the project. These members include representation from companies and groups such as SPDX, CycloneDX Anchore, Aquasec, IBM, Intel, and many more. If you’re interested in participating as a contributor or advisor representing end users’ needs—or the sources of metadata GUAC consumes—you can register your interest in the relevant GitHub issue.

The GUAC team will be showcasing the project at Kubecon NA 2022 next week. Come by our session if you’ll be there and have a chat with us—we’d be happy to talk in person or virtually!

Posted by Matthew Maurer and Mike Yu, Android team

To help keep Android users’ DNS queries private, Android supports encrypted DNS. In addition to existing support for DNS-over-TLS, Android now supports DNS-over-HTTP/3 which has a number of improvements over DNS-over-TLS.

Most network connections begin with a DNS lookup. While transport security may be applied to the connection itself, that DNS lookup has traditionally not been private by default: the base DNS protocol is raw UDP with no encryption. While the internet has migrated to TLS over time, DNS has a bootstrapping problem. Certificate verification relies on the domain of the other party, which requires either DNS itself, or moves the problem to DHCP (which may be maliciously controlled). This issue is mitigated by central resolvers like Google, Cloudflare, OpenDNS and Quad9, which allow devices to configure a single DNS resolver locally for every network, overriding what is offered through DHCP.

In Android 9.0, we announced the Private DNS feature, which uses DNS-over-TLS (DoT) to protect DNS queries when enabled and supported by the server. Unfortunately, DoT incurs overhead for every DNS request. An alternative encrypted DNS protocol, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), is rapidly gaining traction within the industry as DoH has already been deployed by most public DNS operators, including the Cloudflare Resolver and Google Public DNS. While using HTTPS alone will not reduce the overhead significantly, HTTP/3 uses QUIC, a transport that efficiently multiplexes multiple streams over UDP using a single TLS session with session resumption. All of these features are crucial to efficient operation on mobile devices.

DNS-over-HTTP/3 (DoH3) support was released as part of a Google Play system update, so by the time you’re reading this, Android devices from Android 11 onwards¹ will use DoH3 instead of DoT for well-known² DNS servers which support it. Which DNS service you are using is unaffected by this change; only the transport will be upgraded. In the future, we aim to support DDR which will allow us to dynamically select the correct configuration for any server. This feature should decrease the performance impact of encrypted DNS.

Performance

DNS-over-HTTP/3 avoids several problems that can occur with DNS-over-TLS operation:

• As DoT operates on a single stream of requests and responses, many server implementations suffer from head-of-line blocking³. This means that if the request at the front of the line takes a while to resolve (possibly because a recursive resolution is necessary), responses for subsequent requests that would have otherwise been resolved quickly are blocked waiting on that first request. DoH3 by comparison runs each request over a separate logical stream, which means implementations will resolve requests out-of-order by default.
• Mobile devices change networks frequently as the user moves around. With DoT, these events require a full renegotiation of the connection. By contrast, the QUIC transport HTTP/3 is based on can resume a suspended connection in a single RTT.
• DoT intends for many queries to use the same connection to amortize the cost of TCP and TLS handshakes at the start. Unfortunately, in practice several factors (such as network disconnects or server TCP connection management) make these connections less long-lived than we might like. Once a connection is closed, establishing the connection again requires at least 1 RTT.

  In unreliable networks, DoH3 may even outperform traditional DNS. While unintuitive, this is because the flow control mechanisms in QUIC can alert either party that packets weren’t received. In traditional DNS, the timeout for a query needs to be based on expected time for the entire query, not just for the resolver to receive the packet.

Field measurements during the initial limited rollout of this feature show that DoH3 significantly improves on DoT’s performance. For successful queries, our studies showed that replacing DoT with DoH3 reduces median query time by 24%, and 95th percentile query time by 44%. While it might seem suspect that the reported data is conditioned on successful queries, both DoT and DoH3 resolve 97% of queries successfully, so their metrics are directly comparable. UDP resolves only 83% of queries successfully. As a result, UDP latency is not directly comparable to TLS/HTTP3 latency because non-connection-oriented protocols have a different notion of what a "query" is. We have still included it for rough comparison.

Memory Safety

The DNS resolver processes input that could potentially be controlled by an attacker, both from the network and from apps on the device. To reduce the risk of security vulnerabilities, we chose to use a memory safe language for the implementation.

Fortunately, we’ve been adding Rust support to the Android platform. This effort is intended exactly for cases like this — system level features which need to be performant or low level (both in this case) and which would carry risk to implement in C++. While we’ve previously launched Keystore 2.0, this represents our first foray into Rust in Mainline Modules. Cloudflare maintains an HTTP/3 library called quiche, which fits our use case well, as it has a memory-safe implementation, few dependencies, and a small code size. Quiche also supports use directly from C++. We considered this, but even the request dispatching service had sufficient complexity that we chose to implement that portion in Rust as well.

We built the query engine using the Tokio async framework to simultaneously handle new requests, incoming packet events, control signals, and timers. In C++, this would likely have required multiple threads or a carefully crafted event loop. By leveraging asynchronous in Rust, this occurs on a single thread with minimal locking⁴. The DoH3 implementation is 1,640 lines and uses a single runtime thread. By comparison, DoT takes 1,680 lines while managing less and using up to 4 threads per DoT server in use.

Safety and Performance — Together at Last

With the introduction of Rust, we are able to improve both security and the performance at the same time. Likewise, QUIC allows us to improve network performance and privacy simultaneously. Finally, Mainline ensures that such improvements are able to make their way to more Android users sooner.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Luke Huang who greatly contributed to the development of this feature, and Lorenzo Colitti for his in-depth review of the technical aspects of this post.

Posted by Elie Bursztein, Security & Anti-abuse Research Lead, and Jean-Michel Picod, Software Engineer, Google  Today, FIDO security...

• Make “/tmp/user/controlled” a file with controlled content.
• The kernel resolves that path for the first argument to rename() and sees the file.
• Replace “/tmp/user/controlled” with a symlink to /etc/cron.
• The kernel resolves the path again for the second argument and ends up in /etc/cron.
• If both the tmp and cron directories are on the filesystem, the kernel will move the attacker controlled file to /etc/cron, leading to code execution as root.

We’ve become aware of an issue that affects the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) version of the Titan Security Key available in the U.S. and are providing users with the immediate steps they need to take to protect themselves and to receive a free replacement key. This bug affects Bluetooth pairing only, so non-Bluetooth security keys are not affected. Current users of Bluetooth Titan Security Keys should continue to use their existing keys while waiting for a replacement, since security keys provide the strongest protection against phishing.

What is the security issue?

Due to a misconfiguration in the Titan Security Keys’ Bluetooth pairing protocols, it is possible for an attacker who is physically close to you at the moment you use your security key -- within approximately 30 feet -- to (a) communicate with your security key, or (b) communicate with the device to which your key is paired. In order for the misconfiguration to be exploited, an attacker would have to align a series of events in close coordination:

• When you’re trying to sign into an account on your device, you are normally asked to press the button on your BLE security key to activate it. An attacker in close physical proximity at that moment in time can potentially connect their own device to your affected security key before your own device connects. In this set of circumstances, the attacker could sign into your account using their own device if the attacker somehow already obtained your username and password and could time these events exactly.
  
• Before you can use your security key, it must be paired to your device. Once paired, an attacker in close physical proximity to you could use their device to masquerade as your affected security key and connect to your device at the moment you are asked to press the button on your key. After that, they could attempt to change their device to appear as a Bluetooth keyboard or mouse and potentially take actions on your device.

This security issue does not affect the primary purpose of security keys, which is to protect you against phishing by a remote attacker. Security keys remain the strongest available protection against phishing; it is still safer to use a key that has this issue, rather than turning off security key-based two-step verification (2SV) on your Google Account or downgrading to less phishing-resistant methods (e.g. SMS codes or prompts sent to your device). This local proximity Bluetooth issue does not affect USB or NFC security keys.

Am I affected?

This issue affects the BLE version of Titan Security Keys. To determine if your key is affected, check the back of the key. If it has a “T1” or “T2” on the back of the key, your key is affected by the issue and is eligible for free replacement.

Steps to protect yourself

If you want to minimize the remaining risk until you receive your replacement keys, you can perform the following additional steps:

iOS devices:

On devices running iOS version 12.2 or earlier, we recommend using your affected security key in a private place where a potential attacker is not within close physical proximity (approximately 30 feet). After you’ve used your key to sign into your Google Account on your device, immediately unpair it. You can use your key in this manner again while waiting for your replacement, until you update to iOS 12.3.

Once you update to iOS 12.3, your affected security key will no longer work. You will not be able to use your affected key to sign into your Google Account, or any other account protected by the key, and you will need to order a replacement key. If you are already signed into your Google Account on your iOS device, do not sign out because you won’t be able to sign in again until you get a new key. If you are locked out of your Google Account on your iOS device before your replacement key arrives, see these instructions for getting back into your account. Note that you can continue to sign into your Google Account on non-iOS devices.

On Android and other devices:

We recommend using your affected security key in a private place where a potential attacker is not within close physical proximity (approximately 30 feet). After you’ve used your affected security key to sign into your Google Account, immediately unpair it. Android devices updated with the upcoming June 2019 Security Patch Level (SPL) and beyond will automatically unpair affected Bluetooth devices, so you won’t need to unpair manually. You can also continue to use your USB or NFC security keys, which are supported on Android and not affected by this issue.

How to get a replacement key

We recommend that everyone with an affected BLE Titan Security Key get a free replacement by visiting google.com/replacemykey.

Is it still safe to use my affected BLE Titan Security Key?

It is much safer to use the affected key instead of no key at all. Security keys are the strongest protection against phishing currently available.

Posted by Christiaan Brand, Product Manager, Google Cloud We’ve become aware of an issue that affects the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) vers...

Posted by Jeff Vander Stoep, Android Security & Privacy Team and Chong Zhang, Android Media Team

Android Q Beta versions are now publicly available. Among the various new features introduced in Android Q are some important security hardening changes. While exciting new security features are added in each Android release, hardening generally refers to security improvements made to existing components.

When prioritizing platform hardening, we analyze data from a number of sources including our vulnerability rewards program (VRP). Past security issues provide useful insight into which components can use additional hardening. Android publishes monthly security bulletins which include fixes for all the high/critical severity vulnerabilities in the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) reported through our VRP. While fixing vulnerabilities is necessary, we also get a lot of value from the metadata - analysis on the location and class of vulnerabilities. With this insight we can apply the following strategies to our existing components:

• Contain: isolating and de-privileging components, particularly ones that handle untrusted content. This includes:
  • Access control: adding permission checks, increasing the granularity of permission checks, or switching to safer defaults (for example, default deny).
  • Attack surface reduction: reducing the number of entry/exit points (i.e. principle of least privilege).
  • Architectural decomposition: breaking privileged processes into less privileged components and applying attack surface reduction.
• Mitigate: Assume vulnerabilities exist and actively defend against classes of vulnerabilities or common exploitation techniques.

Here’s a look at high severity vulnerabilities by component and cause from 2018:

Most of Android’s vulnerabilities occur in the media and bluetooth components. Use-after-free (UAF), integer overflows, and out of bounds (OOB) reads/writes comprise 90% of vulnerabilities with OOB being the most common.

A Constrained Sandbox for Software Codecs

In Android Q, we moved software codecs out of the main mediacodec service into a constrained sandbox. This is a big step forward in our effort to improve security by isolating various media components into less privileged sandboxes. As Mark Brand of Project Zero points out in his Return To Libstagefright blog post, constrained sandboxes are not where an attacker wants to end up. In 2018, approximately 80% of the critical/high severity vulnerabilities in media components occurred in software codecs, meaning further isolating them is a big improvement. Due to the increased protection provided by the new mediaswcodec sandbox, these same vulnerabilities will receive a lower severity based on Android’s severity guidelines.

The following figure shows an overview of the evolution of media services layout in the recent Android releases.

• Prior to N, media services are all inside one monolithic mediaserver process, and the extractors run inside the client.
• In N, we delivered a major security re-architect, where a number of lower-level media services are spun off into individual service processes with reduced privilege sandboxes. Extractors are moved into server side, and put into a constrained sandbox. Only a couple of higher-level functionalities remained in mediaserver itself.
• In O, the services are “treblized,” and further deprivileged that is, separated into individual sandboxes and converted into HALs. The media.codec service became a HAL while still hosting both software and hardware codec implementations.
• In Q, the software codecs are extracted from the media.codec process, and moved back to system side. It becomes a system service that exposes the codec HAL interface. Selinux policy and seccomp filters are further tightened up for this process. In particular, while the previous mediacodec process had access to device drivers for hardware accelerated codecs, the software codec process has no access to device drivers.

With this move, we now have the two primary sources for media vulnerabilities tightly sandboxed within constrained processes. Software codecs are similar to extractors in that they both have extensive code parsing bitstreams from untrusted sources. Once a vulnerability is identified in the source code, it can be triggered by sending a crafted media file to media APIs (such as MediaExtractor or MediaCodec). Sandboxing these two services allows us to reduce the severity of potential security vulnerabilities without compromising performance.

In addition to constraining riskier codecs, a lot of work has also gone into preventing common types of vulnerabilities.

Bound Sanitizer

Incorrect or missing memory bounds checking on arrays account for about 34% of Android’s userspace vulnerabilities. In cases where the array size is known at compile time, LLVM’s bound sanitizer (BoundSan) can automatically instrument arrays to prevent overflows and fail safely.

BoundSan instrumentation

BoundSan is enabled in 11 media codecs and throughout the Bluetooth stack for Android Q. By optimizing away a number of unnecessary checks the performance overhead was reduced to less than 1%. BoundSan has already found/prevented potential vulnerabilities in codecs and Bluetooth.

More integer sanitizer in more places

Android pioneered the production use of sanitizers in Android Nougat when we first started rolling out integer sanization (IntSan) in the media frameworks. This work has continued with each release and has been very successful in preventing otherwise exploitable vulnerabilities. For example, new IntSan coverage in Android Pie mitigated 11 critical vulnerabilities. Enabling IntSan is challenging because overflows are generally benign and unsigned integer overflows are well defined and sometimes intentional. This is quite different from the bound sanitizer where OOB reads/writes are always unintended and often exploitable. Enabling Intsan has been a multi year project, but with Q we have fully enabled it across the media frameworks with the inclusion of 11 more codecs.

IntSan Instrumentation

IntSan works by instrumenting arithmetic operations to abort when an overflow occurs. This instrumentation can have an impact on performance, so evaluating the impact on CPU usage is necessary. In cases where performance impact was too high, we identified hot functions and individually disabled IntSan on those functions after manually reviewing them for integer safety.

BoundSan and IntSan are considered strong mitigations because (where applied) they prevent the root cause of memory safety vulnerabilities. The class of mitigations described next target common exploitation techniques. These mitigations are considered to be probabilistic because they make exploitation more difficult by limiting how a vulnerability may be used.

Shadow Call Stack

LLVM’s Control Flow Integrity (CFI) was enabled in the media frameworks, Bluetooth, and NFC in Android Pie. CFI makes code reuse attacks more difficult by protecting the forward-edges of the call graph, such as function pointers and virtual functions. Android Q uses LLVM’s Shadow Call Stack (SCS) to protect return addresses, protecting the backwards-edge of control flow graph. SCS accomplishes this by storing return addresses in a separate shadow stack which is protected from leakage by storing its location in the x18 register, which is now reserved by the compiler.

SCS Instrumentation

SCS has negligible performance overhead and a small memory increase due to the separate stack. In Android Q, SCS has been turned on in portions of the Bluetooth stack and is also available for the kernel. We’ll share more on that in an upcoming post.

eXecute-Only Memory

Like SCS, eXecute-Only Memory (XOM) aims at making common exploitation techniques more expensive. It does so by strengthening the protections already provided by address space layout randomization (ASLR) which in turn makes code reuse attacks more difficult by requiring attackers to first leak the location of the code they intend to reuse. This often means that an attacker now needs two vulnerabilities, a read primitive and a write primitive, where previously just a write primitive was necessary in order to achieve their goals. XOM protects against leaks (memory disclosures of code segments) by making code unreadable. Attempts to read execute-only code results in the process aborting safely.

Tombstone from a XOM abort

Starting in Android Q, platform-provided AArch64 code segments in binaries and libraries are loaded as execute-only. Not all devices will immediately receive the benefit as this enforcement has hardware dependencies (ARMv8.2+) and kernel dependencies (Linux 4.9+, CONFIG_ARM64_UAO). For apps with a targetSdkVersion lower than Q, Android’s zygote process will relax the protection in order to avoid potential app breakage, but 64 bit system processes (for example, mediaextractor, init, vold, etc.) are protected. XOM protections are applied at compile-time and have no memory or CPU overhead.

Scudo Hardened Allocator

Scudo is a dynamic heap allocator designed to be resilient against heap related vulnerabilities such as:

• Use-after-frees: by quarantining freed blocks.
• Double-frees: by tracking chunk states.
• Buffer overflows: by check summing headers.
• Heap sprays and layout manipulation: by improved randomization.

Scudo does not prevent exploitation but rather proactively manages memory in a way to make exploitation more difficult. It is configurable on a per-process basis depending on performance requirements. Scudo is enabled in extractors and codecs in the media frameworks.

Tombstone from Scudo aborts

Contributing security improvements to Open Source

AOSP makes use of a number of Open Source Projects to build and secure Android. Google is actively contributing back to these projects in a number of security critical areas:

• Creator and primary contributor to AddressSanitizer and other "sanitizer" (compiler-based dynamic testing tools) to LLVM.
• Primary contributor to compiler-based hardening tools in LLVM (ControlFlowIntegrity, ShadowCallStack).
• Creator of fuzzing tools (AFL, libFuzzer, honggfuzz, syzkaller) and fuzzing infrastructure (oss-fuzz, syzbot) for user-space and OS kernels.
• Participant in research related to hardware-assisted memory safety.
• Primary contributor of the Scudo hardened allocator to LLVM.

Thank you to Ivan Lozano, Kevin Deus, Kostya Kortchinsky, Kostya Serebryany, and Mike Antares for their contributions to this post.

Posted by Rene Mayrhofer and Xiaowen Xin, Android Security & Privacy Team

With every new version of Android, one of our top priorities is raising the bar for security. Over the last few years, these improvements have led to measurable progress across the ecosystem, and 2018 was no different.

In the 4th quarter of 2018, we had 84% more devices receiving a security update than in the same quarter the prior year. At the same time, no critical security vulnerabilities affecting the Android platform were publicly disclosed without a security update or mitigation available in 2018, and we saw a 20% year-over-year decline in the proportion of devices that installed a Potentially Harmful App. In the spirit of transparency, we released this data and more in our Android Security & Privacy 2018 Year In Review.

But now you may be asking, what’s next?

Today at Google I/O we lifted the curtain on all the new security features being integrated into Android Q. We plan to go deeper on each feature in the coming weeks and months, but first wanted to share a quick summary of all the security goodness we’re adding to the platform.

Encryption

Storage encryption is one of the most fundamental (and effective) security technologies, but current encryption standards require devices have cryptographic acceleration hardware. Because of this requirement many devices are not capable of using storage encryption. The launch of Adiantum changes that in the Android Q release. We announced Adiantum in February. Adiantum is designed to run efficiently without specialized hardware, and can work across everything from smart watches to internet-connected medical devices.

Our commitment to the importance of encryption continues with the Android Q release. All compatible Android devices newly launching with Android Q are required to encrypt user data, with no exceptions. This includes phones, tablets, televisions, and automotive devices. This will ensure the next generation of devices are more secure than their predecessors, and allow the next billion people coming online for the first time to do so safely.

However, storage encryption is just one half of the picture, which is why we are also enabling TLS 1.3 support by default in Android Q. TLS 1.3 is a major revision to the TLS standard finalized by the IETF in August 2018. It is faster, more secure, and more private. TLS 1.3 can often complete the handshake in fewer roundtrips, making the connection time up to 40% faster for those sessions. From a security perspective, TLS 1.3 removes support for weaker cryptographic algorithms, as well as some insecure or obsolete features. It uses a newly-designed handshake which fixes several weaknesses in TLS 1.2. The new protocol is cleaner, less error prone, and more resilient to key compromise. Finally, from a privacy perspective, TLS 1.3 encrypts more of the handshake to better protect the identities of the participating parties.

Platform Hardening

Android utilizes a strategy of defense-in-depth to ensure that individual implementation bugs are insufficient for bypassing our security systems. We apply process isolation, attack surface reduction, architectural decomposition, and exploit mitigations to render vulnerabilities more difficult or impossible to exploit, and to increase the number of vulnerabilities needed by an attacker to achieve their goals.

In Android Q, we have applied these strategies to security critical areas such as media, Bluetooth, and the kernel. We describe these improvements more extensively in a separate blog post, but some highlights include:

• A constrained sandbox for software codecs.
• Increased production use of sanitizers to mitigate entire classes of vulnerabilities in components that process untrusted content.
• Shadow Call Stack, which provides backward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) and complements the forward-edge protection provided by LLVM’s CFI.
• Protecting Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) against leaks using eXecute-Only Memory (XOM).
• Introduction of Scudo hardened allocator which makes a number of heap related vulnerabilities more difficult to exploit.

Authentication

Android Pie introduced the BiometricPrompt API to help apps utilize biometrics, including face, fingerprint, and iris. Since the launch, we’ve seen a lot of apps embrace the new API, and now with Android Q, we’ve updated the underlying framework with robust support for face and fingerprint. Additionally, we expanded the API to support additional use-cases, including both implicit and explicit authentication.

In the explicit flow, the user must perform an action to proceed, such as tap their finger to the fingerprint sensor. If they’re using face or iris to authenticate, then the user must click an additional button to proceed. The explicit flow is the default flow and should be used for all high-value transactions such as payments.

Implicit flow does not require an additional user action. It is used to provide a lighter-weight, more seamless experience for transactions that are readily and easily reversible, such as sign-in and autofill.

Another handy new feature in BiometricPrompt is the ability to check if a device supports biometric authentication prior to invoking BiometricPrompt. This is useful when the app wants to show an “enable biometric sign-in” or similar item in their sign-in page or in-app settings menu. To support this, we’ve added a new BiometricManager class. You can now call the canAuthenticate() method in it to determine whether the device supports biometric authentication and whether the user is enrolled.

What’s Next?

Beyond Android Q, we are looking to add Electronic ID support for mobile apps, so that your phone can be used as an ID, such as a driver’s license. Apps such as these have a lot of security requirements and involves integration between the client application on the holder’s mobile phone, a reader/verifier device, and issuing authority backend systems used for license issuance, updates, and revocation.

This initiative requires expertise around cryptography and standardization from the ISO and is being led by the Android Security and Privacy team. We will be providing APIs and a reference implementation of HALs for Android devices in order to ensure the platform provides the building blocks for similar security and privacy sensitive applications. You can expect to hear more updates from us on Electronic ID support in the near future.

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Google and Apple have worked together to create an industry specification – Detecting Unwanted Location Trackers – for Bluetooth tracking devices that makes it possible to alert users across both Android and iOS if such a device is unknowingly being used to track them. This will help mitigate the misuse of devices designed to help keep track of belongings. Google is now launching this capability on Android 6.0+ devices, and today Apple is implementing this capability in iOS 17.5.

With this new capability, Android users will now get a “Tracker traveling with you” alert on their device if an unknown Bluetooth tracking device is seen moving with them over time, regardless of the platform the device is paired with.

If a user gets such an alert on their Android device, it means that someone else’s AirTag, Find My Device network-compatible tracker tag, or other industry specification-compatible Bluetooth tracker is moving with them. Android users can view the tracker’s identifier, have the tracker play a sound to help locate it, and access instructions to disable it. Bluetooth tag manufacturers including Chipolo, eufy, Jio, Motorola, and Pebblebee have committed that future tags will be compatible.

Google’s Find My Device is secure by default and private by design. Multi-layered user protections, including first of its kind safety-first protections, help mitigate potential risks to user privacy and safety while allowing users to effectively locate and recover lost devices. This cross-platform collaboration — an industry first, involving community and industry input — offers instructions and best practices for manufacturers, should they choose to build unwanted tracking alert capabilities into their products. Google and Apple will continue to work with the Internet Engineering Task Force via the Detecting Unwanted Location Trackers working group to develop the official standard for this technology.